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Informality and Corruption Perceptions in Russia’s Regions: Exploring The Effects 
of Gubernatorial Turnover in Patronal Regimes  
 
Gulnaz Sharafutdinova 
King’s College London 
 
 
Introduction 
The endemic nature of corruption in Russia’s political economy has long become a 
common knowledge both inside and outside the country. The societal understanding of 
corruption issues is constructed, on one hand, by the Russian political opposition that 
uses official corruption exposure to mobilize political support behind its cause, as best 
exemplified by Alexey Navalny’s investigations. 1  Anti-corruption policies and 
campaigns are also used as a legitimacy-building tool by the incumbent elites. The 
Kremlin initiated anti-corruption campaign has gained a momentum in the last few years 
and has touched high-ranking state officials that formerly were untouchable. The start of 
the new ‘anti-corruption era’ is associated with Vladimir Putin’s third term in power and 
the first high scale scandal involving Anatoly Serdyukov, then Russia’s minister of 
defense.2 Over the period of last six years the reach and the scale of anti-corruption 
activities in Russia have widened dramatically. Since 2015 five regional governors have 
                                                        
1 The wide scale protests in Russia on March 26, 2017, for example, followed Navalny’s report 
about the luxury property holdings of Russia’s prime minister, Dmitry Medvedev, who allegedly 
owns mansions, villas and yachts both inside and outside the country. As is often the case with 
such property, it is registered through offshore companies and is managed by Medvedev’s friends 
and associates. Medvedev’s spokesperson dismissed the report as the ‘propaganda rant from the 
opposition (see Ioffe 2017). 
2 Dmitry Travin, “Putin i korruptsia,” Rosbalt, October 26, 2017. 
(http://www.rosbalt.ru/blogs/2017/10/25/1655851.html (accessed on March 30, 2018). See also 
Will Englund, “Putin fires Russian defense chief tied to corruption scandal,” Washington Post 
Nov. 6, 2012. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russian-defense-chief-
fired/2012/11/06/f9e5e89c-2816-11e2-bab2-eda299503684_story.html?utm_term=.7df404444cdc 
 2012 (accessed on March 30, 2018). 
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been fired and arrested on corruption charges.3 Several of them were already given harsh 
sentences.4 Russia’s top economic official, Alexey Uliukaev, was dismissed from his post 
in 2016 and charged with extorting a $2 million bribe from the state oil company 
Rosneft.5 In the last few years the law enforcement agencies have been activated across 
the regions, placing them into a unique position of enhanced influence among the 
regional actors.6 The position of the regional governor that used to be the lynchpin of the 
regional political system seems to have been undermined by the growing relevance and 
repressive trends associated with the law enforcement agencies and the control over the 
regional cadres exercised by the Kremlin.   
     
The high political salience of corruption in Russia is not accidental. It reflects the degree 
to which it has permeated the economic and social life of Russian citizens – whether of 
those engaged in business, who might be trying to get through all the common obstacles 
to doing business in Russia, or those who might be encountering it in their everyday life. 
According to recent studies, 35% of Russian entrepreneurs had to give bribes or gifts to 
state officials; furthermore, half of all the business actors were involved in some type of 
corruption schemes.7  Public procurement system in Russia is one of the sites where 
                                                        
3 Aleksandr Khoroshavin (Sakhalin), Nikita Belykh (Kirov), Vyacheslav Gaiser (Komi), 
Aleksandr Solovyev (Udmirtia), and Leonid Markelov (Mari-El).  
4 Nikita Belykh was sentenced for 8 years in prison; Aleksandr Khoroshavin was sentenced for 
13 years. 
5 “Russian Economy Minister Ulyukayev charged with $2m bribe,” BBC news, November 15, 
2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37983744 (accessed March 30, 2018). 
6 Regional governors have indeed commented on the importance of establishing working 
relationships with the law enforcement agencies in the regions. It is evident that these regional 
branches of federal agencies have acquired an additional clout as a result of the anti-corruption 
campaign. 
7 “Na issledovanie korruptsii v Rossii vydelili 2.5 milliona evro,” January 30, 2017. 
https://ptzgovorit.ru/news/na-issledovanie-korrupcii-v-rossii-vydelili-25-milliona-evro (accessed 
March 30, 2018). 
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corruption is still very common despite the reforms undertaken in 2005-2006. 8  The 
Russian judicial system, law enforcement, tax and custom administration also present the 
economic actors with high corruption risk (Russia Corruption Report). 9  Bribes are 
common in Russian citizens’ everyday life as well.  Russia’s healthcare and education 
system as well as the spheres of science and culture have also been named among the 
most corrupt spheres in Russia.10  
 
The rich literature and expanding research on corruption notwithstanding, there are still 
big gaps in our knowledge both about actual corrupt practices as well as the sources and 
determinants of corruption perceptions in Russia. The actual and perceived corruption, 
for example, must be differentiated because they are not always correlated and might 
have different causes and consequences. Such factors as recent media reports and visible 
corruption scandals, use of negative campaigning in politically competitive elections, 
expert ratings, level of cynicism in the society, perceived injustice and various other 
environmental/contextual factors influence corruption perceptions.11 Nonetheless, many 
                                                        
8 See Andrei Yakovlev, Lev Yakobson, and Maria Yudkevich. "The public procurement system 
in Russia: road toward a new quality." Functional Analysis of the Public Procurement System in 
Russia and proposals to improve it. HSE Publishing House, Russia (2009); Anna Balsevich and 
Elena A. Podkolzina. "Indicators of Corruption in Public Procurement: The Example of Russian 
Regions." (2014). 
9 “Russia Corruption Report,” http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-
profiles/russia (accessed March 30, 2018). 
10 Iuditskaya, Anastasia. “Kolokol’tsev nazval samye korrumpirovannye sfery v Rossii,” RBC 
news, October 5, 2016. http://www.rbc.ru/politics/05/10/2016/57f4ddb39a79471c1a6fc13d 
(accessed March 30, 2018) 
11 See for example, Richard Rose and William Mishler "Experience versus perception of 
corruption: Russia as a test case," Global Crime 11, no. 2 (2010): 145-163; Daniel Treisman, 
"What have we learned about the causes of corruption from ten years of cross-national empirical 
research?." Annual Review of Political Science 10 (2007): 211-244; Gulnaz Sharafutdinova, 
"What explains corruption perceptions? The dark side of political competition in Russia's 
regions." Comparative Politics 42 (2), (2010): 147-166; Benjamin Olken, “Corruption 
Perceptions vs. Corruption Reality” Journal of Public Economics 93 (7), (2009): 950-964; 
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studies, including those on corruption in Russia, still rely on corruption perceptions as the 
key indicator of actual corruption.12  
 
Reported corruption is another tricky indicator that, instead of reflecting the actual 
experiences with corruption, might vary depending on the respondents’ fear of 
retribution, prevailing norms against corruption, and even the wording in the 
questionnaire that might seem as self-incrimination to respondents.13 Given the subject’s 
sensitivity, the process of uncovering the cases of corruption is difficult and the results 
could be inaccurate. Most research on corruption relies on surveys and self-reports of 
individuals, firm managers or government officials. But there is a high likelihood that 
they underreport the problem. Scholars have tried to device instruments for diagnosing 
and estimating the prevalence of reticent behavior.14 But the problem of accuracy in 
capturing the extent of this phenomenon is still very acute. 
 
Furthermore, corruption is a very general term that captures a wide variety of activities 
from petty bribery to state capture, and nepotism, and from complex kickback schemes in 
the process of government procurement to shaping laws and regulations for the benefit of 
specific economic actors. Not surprisingly, it might mean different things to different 
respondents. Therefore, blank statements about widespread corruption could be hiding 
very different realities of how corruption works in specific cases and what its political, 
social and economic impact might be. Many sociologists therefore take a critical 
approach towards many large-N, cross-national corruption studies that rely on numerical 
indicators and western, instrumentalist definitions of corruption calling instead for a non-
judgmental analysis of exchange economies - to understand corruption in its specific 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Veronika Belousova, Rajeev K. Goel, and Iikka Korhonen, “Causes of corruption in Russia: A 
disaggregated analysis” (2011). 
12 Oleg Sidorkin and Dmitriy Vorobyev. "Political cycles and corruption in Russian 
regions," European Journal of Political Economy (2017). 
13 Treisman 2007. 
14 Art Kraay and Peter Murrell. “Misunderestimating Corruption,” Policy Research Working 
Paper #6488, The World Bank (2013). 
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contexts, bounded by multiple rationalities approached from the insider rather than 
outsider perspective.15 In the Russian context, for example, the issue of difficulties in 
studying corruption emerge in the context of exploring the systemic nature of corruption 
in Russia – an inherent feature of the Russian state working primarily within the 
paradigm of administrative rent-seeking rather than public goods provision. 16  When 
corruption is systemic and intrinsic to state functioning, any anti-corruption activity on 
the part of the ruling elite appears to have political or rent-seeking purpose. The real anti-
corruption struggle then is expected to take a format of a broader political opposition 
movement aiming at constructing a new state system dedicated to public goods 
provisions and envisioned as such by the society members and the state officials.17 
 
It is widely agreed that corruption matters mostly through its link to governance and its 
effect on investment, economic growth and development.18 It is important therefore to 
understand corruption from the point of view of economic actors and their perceptions of 
the extent to which corruption is viewed as an obstacle to their operations. The diversity 
of Russian regions in this regard serves as a good laboratory for exploring the various 
factors that might be associated with corruption perceptions. Russia is also an interesting 
                                                        
15 Marina Zaloznaya, “Beyond Anti-Corruptionism: Sociological Imagination and Comparative 
Study of Corruption.” Comparative Sociology 12 (5), (2013): 705-751; Svetlana Barsukova and 
Alena Ledeneva, “Ot global’noi korruptsionnoi paradigmy k izucheniiu neformal’nykh praktik: 
razlichie v podkhodakh autsaiderov i insaiderov,” Voprosy ekonomiki  no. 2, (2014), 118-132. 
Vladimir L. Rimski, “Biurokratiia, klientelism i korruptsia v Rossii,” (2011). 
16 Ella Paneyakh, “Goriuche-smazochnoe sredstvo” Otechestvennye zapiski 2 (2012): 47. 
17 Some recent studies, however, show that some anti-corruption policies, such as financial 
disclosure laws, are effective even in the Russian context. See David Szakonyi, “Anti-
Corruption Campaigns and Political Selection: Evidence from Russia,” (March 21, 2018). 
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3101123   
18 Paolo Mauro, Why worry about corruption?. Vol. 6. (International Monetary Fund, 1997); Vito 
Tanzi and Hamid Davoodi. "Corruption, public investment, and growth," in The welfare state, 
public investment, and growth, pp. 41-60 (Springer, Tokyo, 1998); Edgardo J. Campos, Donald 
Lien, and Sanjay Pradhan, "The impact of corruption on investment: Predictability 
matters." World development 27.6 (1999), 1059-1067. 
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case to study corruption perceptions because corruption permeates all spheres of the state 
and society and almost everyone is implicated in some kind of informal or corrupt 
behavior. Therefore, one could expect many contradictions and complexities in how 
people perceive the extent of corruption surrounding them given their awareness of 
potential legal vulnerabilities in their own behavior. One could be both critical of the 
degree of corruption in the government but also reveal complacency when it comes to 
individual strategies of resolving problems (i.e. ready to give a bribe if it helps to resolve 
a problem). “The system made me do it” logic appears very prevalent in many corrupt 
countries.19  It is also plausible to expect that peoples’ opinions about corruption might be 
conditioned by their assessment of its systemic, routinized nature and their belief in the 
plausibility of reducing corrupt practices.  If there is a widespread cynicism about how 
the system itself operates, then the changing corruption perceptions are likely to reflect 
factors other than actual corruption.   
 
The same logic is likely to apply to corruption perceptions of economic actors – firms 
and enterprises – that operate under regulatory and administrative regimes that impose 
various pressures and induce them to seek informal means of resolving the problems they 
encounter. As the administrative and regulatory environment changes over time, the 
adjustment strategies are likely to change as well. Thus, an important shift in tax 
compliance occurred in the early 2000s and created new incentives for economic actors 
to rely more on legal strategies to resolve conflicts as opposed to illegal, corruption-based 
strategies.20  But corruption indicators from enterprise surveys in Russia reveal some 
interesting paradoxes: while the more direct questions on bribe frequency show some 
improvements between 2008 and 2011, the more general and indirect questions on the 
need for bribes to get things done show the situation somewhat worsening in the same 
                                                        
19 Rasma Karklins, The system made me do it: corruption in post-communist societies. (ME 
Sharpe, 2005). 
20 Jordan Gans-Morse, "Demand for Law and the Security of Property Rights: The Case of Post-
Soviet Russia," American Political Science Review 111.2 (2017), 338-359. 
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period.21 Furthermore, the analysis of corruption perceptions in the regions based on 2011 
BEEPS data revealed some additional unanswered questions and contradictions between 
the real and perceived corruption. While corruption might have been growing in the 
regions with longer-sitting governors, firms tended to choose ‘corruption as number one 
obstacle’ less often.22 
 
In this study I address these, corruption perceptions related, puzzles in the Russian 
context by testing a theory of patronal presidentialism advanced by Henry Hale.23 This 
theory brings attention to the systemic nature of informal, patronal linkages connecting 
economic and political elites in many post-Soviet countries and to the special role of the 
president – a country leader – who combines formal and informal mechanisms of control 
and plays a role of a chief arbiter determining access to resources and influence for his 
clients. Because of the integrated nature of the political economy in such systems that 
relies on informal patronage and political connections, the periods of power transfer turn 
into periods of uncertainty for political and economic elites and can lead to open inter-
elite conflicts, defections, and challenges. Such political destabilization can be reflected, 
among other things, in increased corruption perceptions driven by (1) corruption 
becoming more visible and public in the context of inter-elite conflicts, or (2) by the 
economic actors’ sense of insecurity motivated by the upcoming changes in the system. 
 
The remaining of the study is organized into four parts including theoretical background 
and hypotheses; description of the data and methodology; presentation of results; and the 
discussion of main findings.  
 
                                                        
21 Kisunko, Gregory, and Stephen Knack. "Russian Federation: National and Regional Trends in 
Regulatory Burden and Corruption," In Wealth, Income Inequalities, and Demography, pp. 45-
104 (Springer International Publishing, 2014). 
22 Sharafutdinova and Steinbuks (2017), 12-13.  
23 Henry Hale, "Regime cycles: democracy, autocracy, and revolution in post-Soviet 
Eurasia." World Politics 58, no. 1 (2005), 133-165; Henry Hale, Patronal politics: Eurasian 
regime dynamics in comparative perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
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Theoretical Background and Hypotheses    
 
This study is motivated by the idea that understanding corruption perceptions in Russia 
has to take into account the insider view of corruption and be based on comprehending 
the nature of the system economic actors operate in. If it is true that corruption is the 
main mode of operation and, indeed, the very raison d’etre for the system’s maintenance, 
then it is hard to expect that perceptions reflect the reality of corruption and that changes 
in corruption perceptions actually reflect changes in actual corruption. The actors’ own 
involvement in corruption is likely to condition their assessment and perceptions. This 
would mean that other factors are likely to be involved in driving the changes in 
corruption perceptions. 
 
Russia stands out among many other countries by the prevalence of ‘insider 
entrepreneurship.’ New businesses can enter the market only if the business owners are 
part of informal networks and have important political and business connections. 24 
Without such connections and embedded-ness in existing networks new ventures quickly 
die out.25 This phenomenon reflects the general weakness of the institutional environment 
in Russia characterized by weak property rights and contract enforcement. Informal 
networks substitute dysfunctional formal institutions to a certain extent but this effect 
comes at the cost of selection and survival of businesses with connections to state 
administration rather than those that would be most competitive or innovative. This 
situation has been only growing more negative over time. Scholars have suggested 
therefore that the institutional environments such as that of Russia require new analytical 
approaches to explore the effects of such environment on behavior and perceptions of 
actors working within it.26  
                                                        
24 Ruta Aidis, Saul Estrin, and Tomasz Mickiewicz. "Institutions and entrepreneurship 
development in Russia: A comparative perspective." Journal of Business Venturing 23, no. 6 
(2008), 656-672. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid; Sharafutdinova and Steinbuks (2017). 
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In this study I rely on theory of ‘patronal presidentialism’ that allows for the systematic 
exploration of the effects of such particular institutional environment on the actions and 
perceptions of political and economic actors embedded in it.27 Hale’s original theory was 
developed to explain regime cycles in the post-Soviet region but its applicability goes 
beyond the issue of political regime dynamics. This approach views the institutional 
environment (such as that of Russia) as characterized by the dominance and the ‘taken-
for-granted’ nature of informal exchanges between social, political and economic actors.  
Formal institutions and procedures in such systems matter to the extent that they shape 
actors’ expectations about who is in charge. Those on the top of the formal power 
pyramid (such as presidents) combine formal and informal power mechanisms and 
resources and become the ultimate source of authority within their jurisdictions. Periods 
of uncertainty ensue at the moments when such authority figure faces a potential power 
transition – either due to upcoming elections, aging or illness issues that can affect the 
expectations of major players in relation to the likely successor. Given that access to 
power resources and economic wealth are highly intertwined in such systems the stakes 
involved in power transition are extremely high. Therefore, the prospects for political 
change cause increased inter-elite conflict and competition as different groups jockey for 
influence and for an increase of their chances to shape the outcomes of power transition. 
 
Although designed to explain the national-level political developments, this theory is 
effective at the subnational level as well.28 In Russian regions governors play the role of 
an ultimate patron who combines formal and informal mechanisms of power. Most 
informal exchange networks in the regions therefore involve regional authorities and 
regional businesses that have survived through the years have to build productive 
                                                        
27 Hale 2005, 2014.  
28 For an application, see Ildar Gabdrafikov and Henry Hale, "Bashkortostan’s Democratic 
Moment? Patronal Presidentialism, Regional Regime Change, and Identity in 
Russia." Reconstruction and Interaction of Slavic Eurasia and Its Neighboring Worlds, Hokkaido, 
Sapporo University Slavic Research Center (2006), 75-102. 
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relationships with regional authorities. 29  This also means that periods of political 
transition might be perceived as very costly to economic actors who, having invested 
resources into building social capital with present authorities, would fear losing their 
privileges (or even more simply an ability to do their business and make profits) if the 
authorities change. Firms value stability and predictability. 30  Such moments of 
uncertainty are clearly not welcome by economic actors and are associated with the 
worsened business environment in the regions. 31  Their implications for actual and 
perceived corruption might be significant as well. Specifically, in accordance with the 
theory of patronal presidentialism I hypothesize that the proximity of gubernatorial 
turnover is associated with increased corruption perceptions on the part of regional 
economic actors. Furthermore, because this theory builds on actors’ expectations, it is 
important to distinguish between expected and unexpected power turnovers. When a 
power transition occurs unexpectedly (due to governor dying or being replaced for 
personal reasons), the logic outlined by theory would not apply. Hence, my first 
hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H1. Regional level corruption perceptions are higher in regions where economic actors 
go through or expect a gubernatorial change/turnover. 
 
                                                        
29 Timothy Frye, ‘Capture or exchange? Business lobbying in Russia’, Europe-Asia Studies, 54, 
(2002), 1017–1036; Sharafutdinova, Gulnaz. Political consequences of crony capitalism inside 
Russia (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010); Irina Slinko, Yakovlev, Yvgeny 
and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, ‘Laws for sale: Evidence from Russia’, American Law and 
Economics Review, 7, (2005), 284–318; Andrei Yakovlev, “State-business Relations in Russia in 
the 2000s: From the Capture Model to a Variety of Exchange Models?” BOFIT Discussion Paper 
10, Helsinki: BOFIT 2011. 
30 Avinash K. Dixit and Robert S. Pindyck. Investment under uncertainty (Princeton university 
press, 1994). 
31 Sharafutdinova and Steinbuks (2017); Irina Levina, Gregory Kisunko, Israel Marques, and 
Andrei A. Yakovlev. "Uncertainty as a factor in investment decisions: the case of the Russian 
Federation's regions." (2016). 
 11 
At the same time, expectations of gubernatorial change might not always be followed by 
actual gubernatorial transition and some governors can keep their posts in the midst of 
growing scandals and predictions of their upcoming exit. There are a number of 
governors whose stay in power was surrounded by various scandals from the beginning 
of their term in power. The cases of Mikhail Yurevich, ex-governor of Chelyabinsk 
oblast, or Vladimir Artyakov, ex-governor of Samara oblast are telling. Regional protests 
against Artyakov started already in 2010, but he stayed in power until 2012. Also, some 
governors that might have started their work in a politically difficult environment 
associated with inter-elite conflicts, might still stay on. The example of Rustem 
Khamitov, who replaced Bashkortostan’s heavyweight Murtaza Rakhimov, is a case in 
point. Khamitov was re-elected for his second term in 2014 and is likely to keep his post 
still. Accordingly, my second hypotheses states that: 
 
H2. Regional level corruption perceptions are higher in the regions that experience 
increased inter-elite conflict and public scandals even if such conflict does not result in 
an immediate gubernatorial turnover. 
 
Additionally, the causal mechanism of increased corruption perceptions might not only 
reflect mental anxieties and uncertainties about the ongoing or expected political 
transitions but actual changes in rules of the game in terms of informal payments 
expected from the businesses and illicit actions of state officials. Indeed, some studies of 
regional corruption in Russia have uncovered the presence of political cycles revealed 
through governors’ increased corruption at the end of their term or their activities to 
finance electoral campaigns.32 Therefore, my last hypothesis states that: 
 
H3. The indicators of actual corruption are higher in regions where economic and 
political actors go through or expect political/gubernatorial transition. 
  
                                                        
32 Sidorkin and Vorobyev 2017; Maxim Mironov and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, "Corruption in 
procurement and the political cycle in tunneling: Evidence from financial transactions 
data." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 8, no. 2 (2016), 287-321. 
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Data, Measurement, and Methodology 
 
The analysis of regional corruption indicators in this study relies on the data and 
operationalization of corruption produced by the Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey (BEEPS) implemented by the World Bank and the EBRD.  The 
latest 2011 round of BEEPS for the Russian Federation was for the first time designed to 
be representative of Russian regions. The survey includes several measures of different 
types of corruption including indicators of (1) regulatory or administrative burden (i.e. 
the administrative costs incurred by firms in dealing with government regulation of 
business); (2) state capture (i.e. individual actions aimed at influencing the formation of 
legal and regulatory environment in the region); (3) administrative corruption. Previous 
studies relying on these data have shown that regional variation in corruption indicators is 
significant and underexplored.33 So exploring the factors linked to that regional variation 
appears a worthwhile endeavor.  
 
The BEEPS survey combines perception and experience-based questions designed to 
explore patterns of interaction between firms and state actors across a variety of spheres. 
On the issue of corruption firms (usually represented by their managers) were asked to 
rate corruption as an obstacle to their operations (for descriptive statistics see Graph 2) as 
well as a number of questions on the need for informal payments/gifts (i.e. bribes) to get 
things done in various spheres such as getting licenses, construction permits, water and 
electricity connections, customs, etc. A question about the percentage of sales spent on 
informal gifts was intended to get a numerical indicator of real corruption (for descriptive 
statistics see Graph 1). Additionally, three indicators of state capture were used to get at a 
more systemic corruption in the regions. These indicators were constructed using 
questions such as: “To what extent private payments/gifts or other benefits 
to parliamentarians (or, alternatively, to government officials, or local and regional 
officials) to affect their votes had a direct impact on this establishment?” All these 
                                                        
33 Kisunko and Knack 2013; Sharafutdinova and Steinbuks 2017. 
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measures were used as different corruption indicators, differentiated between indicators 
of corruption perceptions and experience of corruption. A total of 4220 firms were 
surveyed across 37 regions with approximately 120 firms per region. 
 
The H1 explanatory variable of the expected and ongoing gubernatorial turnover was 
operationalized in three different ways. The first operationalization sought to capture the 
environment in the regions where governor turnover was about to occur (I use 24 months 
cut-off line to allow for the sufficient number of observations for the analysis). A dummy 
variable was constructed for regions where firms saw their governors being replaced 
within two years the 2011 BEEPS survey was administered. This operationalization relies 
on the assumption that the upcoming turnover is expected by regional economic actors. 
This assumption is true in many cases when governors’ troubles are frequently publicly 
discussed in the media, especially when the governor is involved in public scandals and 
elite conflicts.34 At the same time, it might not accurately reflect the situation in the 
regions where gubernatorial change occurs abruptly.35 The second measure of expected 
political transition was created by measuring general political volatility in the region as 
manifested in the frequency of regional gubernatorial turnovers. I created an indicator of 
regional turnovers by counting the number of gubernatorial transitions in the region since 
1991. This indicator of general political volatility in the region is expected to shape 
economic actors expectations of political change (i.e. those who have gone through more 
rounds of transition would tend to expect more change and those who have been used to 
working in a stable political environment would be operating with expectations for 
stability to continue) and, thereby, shape corruption perceptions as expected by 
Hypothesis 1. 
 
                                                        
34 On the impact of such scandals on governor’s standing, see for example, the 2018 report by 
APEC (Agency for Political and Economic Communication), summarized here: 
http://fedpress.ru/article/1954394 
35 The arrest of Komi’s ex-governor Vyacheslav Gaiser in November 2015, for example, was 
very abrupt and unexpected. For the commentaries from the regional officials see at: 
http://tass.ru/proisshestviya/2275558   
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A different operationalization sought to capture the circumstances of an ongoing power 
transition in the regions where the governor change occurred recently. The same cut-off 
line of 24 months was used to create a dummy variable of a recent political transition. 
The expectation with all of these indicators is that corruption perceptions would be higher 
in regions where more uncertainties are produced (or expected) by political change.  
 
The H2 explanatory variable was created as a dummy variable capturing the presence of 
inter-elite conflicts and regional scandals – during 2010-2012 - that spilled over in the 
regional and federal media. I relied on media reports and expert analysis to create this 
variable and distinguish the regions where governors experienced public pressures 
associated with criminal investigations against their close associates, conflicts with big 
businesses, various scandals and media campaigns, sometimes related to cases where 
governors were not able to establish control over a specific situation, thereby causing 
public criticism and blame.  
 
Finally, H3 used the same explanatory variables as H1 replacing the DVs focused on 
corruption perceptions with the indicator that was created to measure corruption 
experience.  
 
I used ordered logit regression models for ordinal DVs in four different specifications to 
avoid multicollinearity issues. Specifically, due to high correlation between the indicator 
for the upcoming political change and inter-elite conflicts, I divided them between 
models 1 and 3,4. Additionally, for the continuous DV of actual corruption, I used 
Heckman selection model also in four different specifications.36 The first specification 
includes the indicator for the upcoming pol change and the recent gubernatorial 
transition. The second specification includes conflicts and transition. Third specification 
includes only conflict indicator and the forth specification includes only the upcoming 
political change.  
 
All models include control variables of firm age, size, sector, ownership, gross regional 
                                                        
36 Following Sharafutdinova and Steinbuks 2017. 
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product (GRP) composition (construction, retail and extractive sectors as a percentage of 
GRP); log of regional GRP; population density; and regional shares of state-owned and 
privately owned enterprises. These controls were selected based on earlier studies that 
have demonstrated these factors to be associated with firms’ perceptions of business 
environment. 37  Additionally, I include controls for the insider-outsider status of 
governors following the findings in a study of regional business environment in Russia 
that regional actors have a strong preference for insider governors.38 
 
Results 
 
All the results are aggregated in three tables with Table 1 presenting the findings on 
various indicators of corruption perceptions, Table 2 presenting the results on state 
capture indicators and Table 3 - on the measure of actual corruption. The findings 
provide an overall support for Hypothesis 1 that links corruption perceptions to political 
transitions. Specifically, the most consistent result reveals increased corruption 
perceptions in regions that have undergone political change in the last twenty-four 
months. Whether asked about the frequency of informal payments to courts, tax 
authorities, customs/imports services, or about perceived impact of lobbying the 
government officials and parliamentarians (the state capture indicators), firms see more 
corruption in the regions that have undergone a recent political transition. In these regions 
perceptions of corruption as an obstacle are also higher. 
                                                        
37 Meghana Ayyagari, Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Vojislav Maksimovic, V. (2008). ‘How 
important are financing constraints? The role of finance in the business environment’, World 
Bank Economic Review, 22 (2008), 483–516; David Dollar, Mary Hallward-Driemeier and Taye 
Mengistae, ‘Investment climate and firm performance in developing economies’, Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, 54 (2005), 1–31; Benn Eifert, Alan Gelb and Vijaya 
Ramachandran, ‘The cost of doing business in Africa: Evidence from enterprise survey data’, 
World Development, 36, (2008), 1531–1546. 
38 Sharafutdinova and Steinbuks 2017.  
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The indicator of expected political transition has not produced consistent results however. 
Only on one of the state capture measures this indicator works in the expected direction 
and is statistically significant. The rest of the results show the correct direction of the 
relationship but are not statistically significant. The indicator of general political 
volatility, on the other hand, also produces very consistent results. Firms in regions that 
undergo more frequent political change tend to report more frequent informal payments 
to various state authorities and perceive greater level of state capture. The correlation 
coefficients are all statistically significant and in the expected directions. Somewhat 
puzzlingly, corruption is also seen as less of an obstacle in these regions. Potential 
reasons for this discrepancy are discussed in the next section. 
 
The second hypotheses – that corruption perceptions are higher in regions with higher 
level of inter-elite conflict – is also supported in this analysis. Models 3 and 4 that 
incorporate this measure reveal that firms in regions with higher level of conflict tend to 
report more frequent informal payments to various state authorities and perceive greater 
level of state capture. At the same time, yet another puzzling finding is that the 
heightened corruption perceptions do not translate into viewing corruption as a bigger 
obstacle in such regions. 
 
The third hypothesis could only be tested with one, potentially problematic, measure of 
actual corruption. Indeed, the results are somewhat inconsistent. While the indicators of 
political volatility and the ongoing political transition show the results expected based on 
Hypothesis 3, confirming that political volatility might lead to increased actual 
corruption, the measures of elite conflict and expected political change measured through 
the upcoming transition work to decrease actual corruption when measured through the 
share of annual sales spent on informal payments. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
 17 
Scholars of post-Soviet political economy have frequently noted the specific mode of 
interaction between the political and economic spheres in these countries. Various terms 
such as crony capitalism, patrimonialism, patronalism, closed-access order, informal 
economic-political networks, and clans have been used to bring attention to the 
peculiarities of the institutional order that has emerged in this region and the main actors 
operating in it. When economic activity is closely connected with the state and the 
political sphere, the incentive structures, worldviews, attitudes and other perception-
based variables differ dramatically from those in different types of institutional orders 
and require a more nuanced analysis that takes into account the specificity of the system 
that affects the actors’ disposition within it. Hale’s theory of ‘patronal presidentialism’ 
allows for such exploration and was used in this study to develop hypotheses about 
regional corruption and corruption perceptions – as viewed by regional economic actors 
in the Russian Federation. The statistical analysis of corruption perceptions in 37 of 
Russian regions has confirmed the two hypotheses that have linked corruption 
perceptions to political volatility and change. As predicted by theory of patronal 
presidentialism, in the system dominated by a chief executive who controls a variety of 
formal and informal resources, the question of political stability – the ongoing control of 
the rules of the game by the same person on the top of the pyramid - is central to the 
predictability of those rules. When the chief executive is replaced, a new pyramid is built 
and various actors have to invest new resources into integrating into the new system and 
adjusting to a new set of rules. The period of political change is therefore associated with 
new costs and, for some economic actors, serious economic risks. This situation of 
uncertainty affects the economic actors perceptions of corruption. The systemic 
corruption is accepted by most actors operating within the system because firms have to 
adjust to the system in order to operate within it; however, when they face new dangers 
associated with political transition, they could be expected to complain about more 
corruption in the system (because of the dangers facing their firms specifically).  
 
In short, the regional political cycles influence firms’ perceived horizons of stability and 
shape their attitudes about the regional business environment. The unexpected finding of 
divergence of indicators of corruption perceptions and the view of ‘corruption as an 
 18 
obstacle’ presented in the earlier section should arguably be understood along these lines 
as well. Firms complain about state officials, informal payments and state capture more 
in the period of uncertainty (or when such periods are more frequent due to the overall 
political volatility in the system), but at the same time do not see corruption as a bigger of 
an obstacle. Arguably, they comprehend that the underlying reason for uncertainty is the 
nature of rules of the game that change, not the corruption itself (the overall system is 
accepted as given and the main preference is to keep relative privileges enjoyed under a 
given power arrangement). We know that only closely connected firms survive the 
economic competition in Russia and this political selection and adaptation has been going 
on for a while. Firms undoubtedly understand the specificities of the system – if they 
maintain their spot on the market and are available still for responding to various survey 
questionnaires. In short, the economic actors’ perceptions of what corruption looks like 
and when it is most problematic in a system characterized by the dominance of informal 
agreements and the dependence of economic actors on access to and sometimes, 
protection from the state, requires a more in-depth study conducted not through large-N 
surveys but through the more carefully calibrated, structured, in-depth personal or focus 
group interviews. 
 
The analysis presented in this study could also be viewed through the framework of 
‘closed-access orders’ – systems characterized by the limited political and economic 
competition.39  Economic and political actors, who have access to resources, in such 
systems, are most interested in the upkeep of the system and their privileged access 
within it. Any kind of political destabilization is undesirable and viewed as bringing back 
the chaos, disorder and violence in a system where the achievement of order and stability 
and, therefore, some level of predictability, is the main concern. The national level 
narrative promoted by Vladimir Putin therefore focuses on the order and stability 
achieved during the 2000s, juxtaposing this new order to the chaotic and, allegedly, 
dreadful 1990s characterized by much more political pluralism and political and 
                                                        
39 See Douglas North, John Wallis and Barry Weingast, Violence and Social Orders: A 
Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009). 
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economic competition.40 It is evident that the level of corruption in Russia has increased 
dramatically and its systemic nature has become more entrenched, yet the argument about 
the 1990s is one of the most potent legitimation tropes in contemporary Russia. 
 
The analysis in this study points to the need for more caution in treating corruption 
perceptions as a proxy for real corruption. Using the same BEEPS data on corruption, 
Sidorkin and Vorobyev (2018) argued that regional corruption increases when governors 
expect their own departure. The causal mechanism described in their study – that of 
regions experiencing a kind of ‘looting’ by the departing regional administration – 
arguably simplifies the realities due to confusing firms corruption perceptions (argued 
here to be caused by the sense of uncertainty rather than the real state of corruption) with 
actual corruption in the regions and does not take into account several other important 
factors. Gubernatorial turnovers – especially in the era of appointments - are often quite 
unpredictable even to governors themselves.41 It has been observed that such turnovers 
are frequently paralleled by media campaigns against the sitting governors and scandals 
surrounding the regional administration officials. However, such atmosphere can 
sometimes go on over months and even years. And governors can try to defend 
themselves by appealing to their patrons in Moscow or elsewhere. To expect that during 
such uncertain time their behavior would become even more brazen with regards to 
corruption appears as a bit far-fetched. If anything, the governors faced with such 
uncertainty could be expected to behave more accurately, especially in the presence of 
law enforcement agencies, as it has frequently happened.  
 
The question of measuring actual corruption is very challenging indeed. In this study, the 
indicator for corruption experience did not produce consistent results and, instead of 
rationalizing the inconsistencies, it appears to be more intellectually honest to note that 
the measure of actual corruption implemented through the reports of the share of annual 
                                                        
40 For more on this logic of transformation from the 1990s to the 2000s, see Sharafutdinova 2010. 
41 Various think tanks and agencies constructing gubernatorial ratings in Russia try to predict 
‘who is next.’ But frequently these decisions are made en masse, by the Kremlin, as was clearly 
demonstrated in a massive turnover of regional governors in 2017.   
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sales paid as bribes is likely to be problematic and not reflect realities with corruption. 
The propensity for honest reporting on the actual share of bribes would differ 
dramatically across the regions and, in all likelihood, follow different rationales for such 
divergences. In some regions there might be an accepted norm of bribe-taking by some 
state agencies and the firms might report on that; in other regions (more politically stable 
and integrated) bribes might not play an important role because the economic sphere is 
dominated by firms closely connected to government officials and, thus, be protected by 
them. Yet another scenario is that firms in regions with more active and recent anti-
corruption activities might be afraid to report these numbers to start with, denying that 
bribery plays an important role.42  
 
It is also important to pay attention to the temporal dynamics of regional corruption that 
might or might not produce a shift in perceptions of corruption. The activation of law 
enforcement agencies in the regions since 2012 and the unprecedented and growing 
number of arrests and convictions of sitting governors in the last few years might have 
changed the situation in this realm. It is clear that the Kremlin is trying to send a signal 
that corruption is tolerated less. But given corruption is systemic and the actors 
comprehend it in that way, the way governors react to this signal might activate responses 
that do not relate to corruption itself but to various strategies of escaping the 
accountability. The research agenda on corruption in Russia therefore remains wide open 
for further studies.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
42 The law enforcement agencies have been activated in the last years but their activities were not 
uniform in all regions. 
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Appendices 
A. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Graph 1 
 
 
Graph 2 
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B. Regression Tables 
Table 1. Corruption Perceptions  
(ordered logit models) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Frequency of informal payments to get things done 
Future turnover -0.006 (0.088)    
Past turnover 0.593***(0.109) 0.595***(0.102) 0.604***(0.102) 0.002 (0.009) 
Elite conflict   0.171** (0.081) 0.148* (0.083) 
Polit volatility  0.060* (0.033) 0.056* (0.032) 0.059* (0.034) 
Insider 
-1.058*** 
 (0.092) 
-1.053*** 
(0.093) 
-1.094*** 
(0.093) 
-0.966*** 
(0.097) 
Frequency of informal payments to customs/imports 
Future turnover -0.006 (0.088) 0.234 (0.981) 0.280 (1.072) 0.070 (0.976) 
Past turnover 0.593*** (0.109) 0.595***(0.102) 0.604*** (0.102)  
Elite conflict   0.171**(0.081) 0.148* (0.083) 
Polit volatility  0.060* (0.033) 0.056* (0.032) 0.059* (0.034) 
Insider 
-1.058*** 
 (0.092) 
-1.053*** 
(0.093) 
-1.094*** 
(0.093) 
-0.966*** 
(0.097) 
Frequency of informal payments to courts 
Future turnover -0.006 (0.088) 0.234 (0.981) 0.280 (1.072) 0.070 (0.976) 
Past turnover 0.593*** (0.109) 0.595***(0.102) 0.604*** (0.102)  
Elite conflict   0.171**(0.081) 0.148* (0.083) 
Polit volatility  0.060* (0.033) 0.056* (0.032) 0.059* (0.034) 
Insider 
-1.058*** 
 (0.092) 
-1.053*** 
(0.093) 
-1.094*** 
(0.093) 
-0.966*** 
(0.097) 
Frequency of informal payments to tax collection officers 
Future turnover -0.011 (0.105)    
Past turnover 0.696*** (0.132) 
0.708*** 
(0.128) 
0.729*** (0.128)  
Elite conflict   0.287*** (0.108) 0.248**(0.106) 
Polit volatility  0.083* (0.045) 0.074* (0.042) 0.067 (0.044) 
Insider 
-1.066*** 
 (0.112) 
-1.058*** 
(0.111) 
-1.121*** 
(0.112) 
-0.971*** 
(0.115) 
Corruption as an obstacle 
Future turnover 
0.073 
 (0.080) 
   
Past turnover 0.350***(0.120) 0.320***(0.109) 0.322***(0.109)  
Elite conflict   0.076 (0.083) 0.067 (0.084) 
Polit volatility  -0.088**(0.036) -0.089**(0.036) -0.087**(0.037) 
Insider -0.277**(0.095) 
-0.275*** 
 (0.092) 
-0.291*** 
(0.092) 
-0.225** 
(0.088) 
Note: ***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1 
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Table 2 Perceptions of State Capture 
(ordered logit models) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Informal payments to parliamentarians have direct impact 
Future turnover 0.183 (0.157)    
Past turnover 0.841*** (0.161) 0.826*** (0.151) 1.000*** (0.152) -0.012 (0.017) 
Elite conflict   0.781***(0.132) 0.629*** (0.131) 
Polit volatility  0.277*** (0.059) 0.250*** (0.051) 0.217*** (0.056) 
Insider -1.162*** (0.143) -1.156*** (0.138) -1.358***(0.140) -1.192***(0.154) 
Informal payments to government officials have direct impact 
Future turnover 0.280* (0.149)  
 
 
 
Past turnover 
0.889*** 
(0.153) 
0.817*** 
(0.145) 
0.998*** 
(0.144) 
 
Elite conflict   0.853*** (0.124) 0.705***(0.126) 
Polit volatility  0.271***(0.059) 0.250***(0.053) 0.215***(0.057) 
Insider 
-1.119*** 
(0.140) 
-1.105*** 
(0.135) 
-1.339*** 
(0.139) 
-1.157*** 
(0.152) 
Informal payments to regional officials have direct impact 
Future turnover 0.112 (0.136)    
Past turnover 0.659***(0.141) 0.654***(0.135) 0.767***(0.135)  
Elite conflict   0.694*** (0.112) 0.610***(0.115) 
Polit volatility  0.242***(0.050) 0.217***(0.047) 0.196***(0.050) 
Insider 
-0.958*** 
(0.130) 
-0.945*** 
 (0.126) 
-1.124*** 
(0.129) 
-0.985*** 
(0.138) 
Note: ***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1 
 
 
 
Table 3 Corruption Experience  
(Percentage of annual sales paid as informal payments, Heckit regression model) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Future turnover -0.085**(0.040)    
Past turnover 0.134***(0.047) 0.163*** (0.046) 0.156*** (0.047)  
Elite conflict   -0.107** (0.049) -0.115** (0.049) 
Polit volatility 
 
 
0.033* (0.017) 0.032* (0.017) 0.027 (0.017) 
Insider -0.036 (0.055) -0.050 (0.054) -0.015 (0.052) -0.005 (0.055) 
Note: ***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
